Abstract
In this paper I defend a version of expressivism about epistemic discourse. The version of expressivism I defend is a species of what I have elsewhere called ‘Ecumenical Expressivism’. I argue for three main theses. First, I argue that at least some of the most powerful arguments for metaethical expressivism carry over nicely to provide arguments for expressivism about epistemic discourse. Second, I argue that existing expressivist accounts of epistemic discourse are problematic. Third, and finally, I argue that Ecumenical Expressivism can evade some of those problems and provide a more plausible version of expressivism about epistemic discourse.
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