Abstract
This paper explores the question whether an adequate account of the facts about imagination and mental imagery must construe mental images as objects. Much of the paper is a study of Alastair Hannay's defense of an affirmative answer in his wide‐ranging study, Mental Images ‐ A Defence. The paper first sets out and evaluates Hannay's case. The second part develops an alternative account of mental images, including non‐visual images, which Hannay does not treat in detail. The alternative account is analogous to the adverbial theory of perception; and it is suggested how this account, without construing mental images as objects, might accommodate the data from which Hannay argues for their objecthood.
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