II. Power and Autonomy: Further Comments on the Many Faces of Power

Abstract

The current emphasis in sociological literature on the study of power in decision making contexts1 and extended to contrived 'non-decision making' by Bachrach and Baratz2 has recently been criticized by Lukes.3 Lukes argues that the 'two faces of power* exhibited in the decision and non-decision making approaches need to be augmented by a third dimension of power which can deal with latent conflict, that is '. . . a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude* (Lukes, p. 24). Lukes suggests that the basic conception of power should be 'A affecting B in a manner contrary to B's interests'. Stimulated by Lukes' radical approach and the inevitable question of the accessibility of 'real interests', Abell4 has attempted to reformulate 'the many faces of power', still broadly within a decision-making framework, but using the concept of autonomy in place of 'real interests'. In contrast to the usual causal models of power, Abell employs a teleological paradigm centred on B's motivation and intentions. He extends his earlier model, which was developed in the context of organizations by elaborating three processes: power, influence and manipulation.5 The exercise of power is defined as requiring the use of sanctions and is associated with a change in B's behaviour but with no change in his convictions.6 Influence and manipulation are conceived as processes which are independent of the use of sanctions and are evidenced by a change in both B's behaviour and his convictions. Influence and manipulation are distinguished in terms of B's autonomy which, broadly, is defined as B's 'range of alternatives'. When B's autonomy is maintained or increased then the process is called influence; when B's autonomy is decreased then he has been subject to manipulation. It appears that Abell introduces autonomy not only in an attempt to replace 'real interest' on grounds of its empirical inaccessibility, but also to avoid the authoritarian implications of using (and hence claiming 'real' knowledge) of these interests. He seems to be substituting Lukes' radical approach with what might be called a liberal view of self-direction and choice as the inverse function of the experience of power processes. Perhaps it is this political orientation as much as a technical decision deriving from empirical difficulties that underlies his choice of a teleological rather than a causal paradigm. He suggests that a teleological explanation of power in terms of B's intentions will elucidate the concept of manipulation and usefully contribute to more general questions about autonomous behaviour. Certainly the majority of models of social action (whether at the sociological or psychological level) avoid, or at least neglect, questions of autonomy and choice virtually by definition given their almost inevitably deterministic construction.7 Therefore the value of a model which attempts to use such concepts, particularly in the area of power, should not be underestimated. Nevertheless Abell's approach is open to several criticisms which need to be examined if the model is to be usefully developed.