Abstract
We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
