Abstract
In a most valuable recent article, on Desire for the Good and the Involuntariness of Wrongdoing: Gorgias 466a-468e,' Kevin McTighe challenges a misguided but widely accepted interpretation of the Socratic paradox 'No one does wrong voluntarily'. According to McTighe, this interpretation has the paradox rely on the blatantly counterintuitive notion that what one desires is distinct from what seems good to one (when that is not in fact good). McTighe dubs this notion 'DG'.2 The interpretation, by assuming DG, disallows the possibility of desiring what is not in fact good here, injustice thereby rendering all wrongdoing involuntary. Whereas there can be no doubt that Socrates does conclude from his discussion with Polus that ul&Eva Pouko6REvov &6tXEiV (Gorg. 509e6), McTighe contends convincingly that Socrates' argument with Polus is to be understood ad hominem, as purgative in the sense elaborated in the Sophist,3 and therefore not as expressive of the Socratic position.4 McTighe's own view, which I share, is that the paradox 'No one does wrong voluntarily' does not assume DG. On the contrary, the paradox accepts that people desire what seems good to them and that what seems good to them is sometimes unjust. The task at hand, then, is to interpret the paradox without recourse to DG, i.e., to give content to involuntary wrongdoing that is nevertheless desired wrongdoing. McTighe takes up this task in Section VI of his paper.5 It is with the claims of this section that I wish to take issue, in particular with the claims (a) that 'involuntary' wrongdoing means wrongdoing that is exempt from blame,6 and (b) that Socrates (Plato) in fact regards all wrongdoing as exempt from blame. For McTighe, claims (a) and (b) are linked: the Socratic paradox states that wrongdoers are blameless, Socrates is committed to the paradox, hence Socrates is committed to wrongdoers' blamelessness. By challenging McTighe's interpretation of the paradox, however, I simultaneously challenge the
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