Abstract
This paper explores two questions: how do MNEs engage opposing political actors when they enter host country political conflicts? What factors underscore which political behaviors prove to yield more favorable outcomes for the firm? Through an abductive case study of mining MNEs during the Congo Wars, I explore how institutional changes during host country political conflicts introduce new dynamic considerations into the kinds of political behaviors MNEs adopt during entry into these environments. I develop two dimensions of MNE political behavior – a passive-active one and a neutral-partisan one – that I integrate into the bargaining power model; specifically, I find that MNEs exhibiting more partisan political behaviors benefit from the enhanced bargaining power, while more neutral behaviors tended to meet unfavorable outcomes.
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