Abstract
Philosophical legal ethics, a sub-discipline of legal ethics arguably initiated by Charles Fried and Richard Wasserstrom, follows a consistent methodological structure: first, what is the ‘standard conception’ of the lawyer's role? second, what is the relationship between the standard conception – the conception of the lawyer as a partisan advocate for her client, neutral about (and unaccountable for) the morality of her client's aims – and the claims of morality more generally? and third, given that relationship, can what lawyers do be morally justified? or should what lawyers do be changed? The concerns of philosophical legal ethics are not primarily doctrinal; they analyse the lawyer's role with some generality and are fundamentally rooted in philosophy, moral or political. This article uses two recent publications in the area of philosophical legal ethics – Daniel Markovits's A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary Advocacy in a Democratic Age and Tim Dare's Counsel of Rogues? A Defense of the Standard Conce...
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