If it's an animal it has axons: Experience and culture in preschool children's reasoning about animates

Abstract

To claim that young children's biological thought is anthropocentric or that their induction depends on similarity rather than categories is to overlook the role of experience in reasoning. We tested four groups of 4-year-olds differing in two aspects of exposure to biological information: (a) their direct experience with nature (urban versus rural) and (b) biological expertise of their parents (expert biologists versus laypeople). We used a modified version of a novel feature projection task—in which projections are made from humans, mammals and insects to an array of nine targets representing various ontological kinds. Children's exposure to biology had consequences on their patterns of induction. There was an effect of parents’ expertise: laypeople's children's projections were based on similarity, while experts’ children's projections were based on the category animal. There was also an effect of direct experience: rural children were more restricted in their responses than were urban children. Although we found asymmetries in projections between humans and animals, humans were not a better source of knowledge about animates than were mammals or insects. These results show that the early emergence of domain specific biological thought and the use of biological categories in induction are highly contingent on children's experience.