Idiotic or Columbo’s Wife? Constitutional Conventions in the Czech Republic

Abstract

Academics usually look for constitutional conventions in Westminster-style democracies, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, or Australia. Nevertheless, growing evidence from practice shows that constitutional conventions are similarly essential attributes of even substantially different political regimes. This article is the first paper to systematically deal with constitutional conventions in the Czech Republic. To be more specific, I identify eight existing constitutional conventions there: (1) respect for the parliamentary majority, (2) institution of a formateur, (3) simultaneous existence of two prime ministers, (4) new cabinet’s statement of policy, (5) delegation of negotiation and ratification of international treaties, (6) appointment of a (vice-)governor of the Czech National Bank without a countersignature, (7) missing signature of the president under laws, and (8) single vice-chairperson of the Supreme Court. On one hand, the scrutiny shows that constitutional conventions play an already established and important role even in a Central European democracy. On the other hand, the lack of political respect for unwritten rules and the relative immaturity of Czech democracy confirm that constitutional conventions are as fragile (or as strong) as political actors allow. Thanks to these facts, the study of constitutional conventions in the post-communist country is a precious laboratory with universal findings even for long-existing democracies.