Ideological dilemma: Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet split, 1962–63

Abstract

This paper uses new archival and other documents in analysing the interactions between Chinese domestic politics and international politics and the impacts on Sino-Soviet relations from early 1962 to July 1963. The article proposes a more coherent theoretical approach to the study of the Sino-Soviet split and in particular the role of ideology during the split. This paper concludes that the dynamics of an ideological dilemma were in full play during this period. Mao, the paramount leader in the Chinese political system, intentionally linked his foreign and internal political ideological struggles and, to a large extent, manipulated and escalated Sino-Soviet ideological disputes for his domestic political purposes, namely pushing for his domestic radical programs, asserting his own ideological supremacy, and perhaps most importantly, checking the power and influence of his political rivals.