Ideological Differences in Epistemic Motivation: Implications for Attitude Structure, Depth of Information Processing, Susceptibility to Persuasion, and Stereotyping

Abstract

Abstract In an extended elaboration of the theory of political ideology as motivated social cognition, we describe ideological differences in epistemic motivation and their consequences for attitude structure, depth of information processing, susceptibility to persuasion, and stereotyping. Liberals score higher than conservatives on need for cognition and open-mindedness, whereas conservatives score higher than liberals on intuitive thinking and self-deception. These differences help to explain greater attitudinal certainty and stability among conservatives, greater ambivalence and more self-reported thinking among liberals, and stronger correspondence between “gut” and “actual” feelings as well as implicit and explicit attitudes among conservatives. Liberals are more likely to process information systematically, recognize differences in argument quality, and to be persuaded explicitly by scientific evidence, whereas conservatives are more likely to process information heuristically, attend to message-irrelevant cues such as source similarity, and to be persuaded implicitly through evaluative conditioning. Conservatives are also more likely than liberals to rely on stereotypical cues and assume consensus with like-minded others.