Ideological Consensus Within Divided Party Government

Abstract

Many scholars have suggested recently that the American electorate intentionally votes to divide control of the Congress and the executive between the Democratic and Republican parties. Lacking full confidence in either party, the voters seek to ensure that neither side has too much power.' Such arguments overlook a much more plausible explanation: voters split their ballots because they see, for example, a Republican president and a Democratic House member supporting similar if not identical positions on various government policies. Indeed, an analysis of district-level voting for the House of Representatives and the president reveals that more often than not districts make ideologically consistent choices. Conservative congressional districts vote for Republican presidents and conservative House members. Liberal districts vote for Democratic presidents and liberal House members. Divided party government, then, is less a result of the voters' preference for partisan balance than the persistence of a prominent conservative wing among congressional Democrats. This persistence has important implications for those concerned with the consequences of divided government. A unified conservative coali-