Abstract
AbstractA multi‐proxy multi‐signature scheme is a useful extension of the basic proxy signature scheme, which allows a group of original signers to delegate their signing rights to a group of proxy signers. At the best of our knowledge, no formal security model and proof has been formalised for the identity‐based multi‐proxy multi‐signature (IBMPMS) scheme from bilinear pairings so far, whereas due to applications of the IBMPMS scheme in distributed systems, grid computing, mobile agent environment and so on, construction of an efficient and provably secure IBMPMS scheme is desired. In this paper, we propose an IBMPMS scheme from bilinear pairings. We also formalise a security model for the IBMPMS schemes from bilinear pairings, and prove that the proposed scheme is secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen‐message and adaptive chosen‐identity attacks in the random oracle model, under the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption. Moreover, the proposed scheme is more efficient in the sense of computation and operation time, with a small signature size than the existing IBMPMS schemes.Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
More From: Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.