Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper challenges both the ‘Geo-sectarian’ and the ‘New Arab Cold War’ explanations of Middle Eastern politics in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. It argues that the omnibalancing behaviour of three wealthy rentier states (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar) in the regional sphere largely reflected the personal calculations of their elites with regard to domestic and regional identity-based threats and opportunities related to the Uprisings. In these calculations, the perceived need to balance against or exploit varied Sunni Islamist groups weighed as heavily as the oft-cited threat of an ascendant Shi’a Iran. But, notwithstanding the increased assertiveness of these Gulf states’ foreign policies over the past decade, ultimately their inconsistency demonstrates underlying volatility and the absence of institutionalised statehood.
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