Identity, necessity and a prioricity:The fallacy of equivocation

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to discuss Kripkc’s reasons for declaring the existence of both necessary a posteriori as well as contingent a priori statements, thus breaking the traditional extensional coincidence of the two pairs of concepts:necessary‐contingent and a priori‐a posteriori. As I shall argue, there is no reason, from Kripke’s work at least, to reject the usual picture of the topic The appeal ot his arguments rests on the ambiguity with which his expressions are used and on the introduction o new senses for old notions. This does not mean, however, that all Knpke’s and Putnam’s intuitions on singular terms and natural kind nouns are wrong. Once Kripke’s ideas are properly uudeistood, they are much moreharmless then they are presented to be and they do not pose a threat to traditional relations relations between modal and epistemological categories