Abstract

Traditional remote data possession auditing mechanisms are usually divided into two types: private auditing and public auditing. Informally, private auditing only allows the original data owner to check the integrity of its outsourced data, whereas anyone is allowed to perform the checking task in public auditing. However, in many practical applications, the data owner expects some designated verifier (instead of others) to audit its data file, which cannot be covered by the existing private or public auditing protocols. Thus, in a recent work, Yan et al. proposed a new auditing technique with a designated verifier [IEEE Systems Journal, 12(4): 1788-1797, 2020]. Nevertheless, we note that this protocol suffers from complicated management of certificates and hence heavily relies on public key infrastructure. To overcome this shortcoming, in this paper, we propose an identity-based auditing protocol with a designated verifier, which not only avoids the introduction of certificates, but also has the desired property of only allowing specific verifier to audit. Its security is based on the classical computational Diffie-Hellman and Weil Diffie-Hellman assumptions. Finally, performance analysis shows that our proposed protocol is very efficient and suitable for some real-life applications.

Highlights

  • In recent years, cloud storage has become an attractive technique for users or data owners (DOs) to store their data since it may have much lower prices than the cost to maintain them on personal devices

  • 3) we propose a concrete construction of IB-DVPDP protocol and prove its security within our model based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and Weil Diffie-Hellman (WDH) assumptions

  • 2) The returned proof ∗ does not equal to the correct one, which would be honestly computed in ProofGen(chal∗, T), we call the IB-DV-provable data possession (PDP) protocol is secure against any PPT malicious cloud service provider (CSP)

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Summary

Introduction

Cloud storage has become an attractive technique for users or data owners (DOs) to store their data since it may have much lower prices than the cost to maintain them on personal devices. After receiving the secret key skO and DV’s identity IDV , the DO computes the trapdoor trd, which can be computed by the DV, by running TrapdoorGen. the DO continues to generate the authenticated file T for the original data file F by performing TagGen(skO, F), and transmits T to CSP for storing. The challenger CHI submits a challenge message chal∗ to CSP in order to check the integrity of some data file F queried in Authenticated-File-Query, who returns a proof ∗.

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