Identifying voter preferences through two-stage multivoting elections: Experiments in the preface of the 2020 democratic primaries

Abstract

This paper examines a method of quantifying voter preferences and behavior using a two-stage multivoting (2SMV) model. The 2SMV model gives voters an endowment of additional votes exceeding the number of policies under consideration in a direct democracy-style election. Voters may freely allocate this endowment to any of the policies up for election. Using the 2SMV mechanism, the paper provides a methodology for identifying voter preferences and voting behavior within a staged multivoting system. From this methodology, three types of voting behavior are defined: policy indifference, strictly-dominating preferences, and fixed-weight preferences. Using experimental data collected from college students, the study evaluates the performance of the two-stage multivoting system in the context of the 2020 Democratic Presidential Primaries, compared to the traditional “one-person, one-vote” (1P1V) system. Using the full sample of observations, the 1P1V system resulted in a tie between Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders, while the 2SMV system selected Joe Biden over Bernie Sanders as the nominee by a 206 net vote difference. The study finds that the 2SMV system produces more unique and distant ranks between candidates, reducing the prevalence of ties common within the 1P1V system.