Abstract
We introduce an incentivized elicitation method for identifying social norms that uses simple coordination games. We demonstrate that concern for the norms we elicit and for money predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game, including data from a novel experiment and from prior published laboratory studies, that are unaccounted for by most current theories of social preferences. Moreover, we find that the importance of social norm compliance and of monetary considerations is fairly constant across different experiments. This consistency allows prediction of treatment effects across experiments, and implies that subjects have a generally stable willingness to sacrifice money to take behaviors that are socially appropriate.
Highlights
Social norms have long been recognized as an important influence on behavior in other social sciences such as social psychology (Sherif 1936; Cialdini et al 1990) and sociology (Merton 1957; Coleman 1990)
We show how the social norms we elicit with the coordination games yield precise and testable behavioral predictions, which we compare to data
We present a method for eliciting ratings over social norms using incentive compatible coordination games, and rely on the important property of social norms that they are jointly recognized among members of a population, rather than privately held
Summary
Social norms have long been recognized as an important influence on behavior in other social sciences such as social psychology (Sherif 1936; Cialdini et al 1990) and sociology (Merton 1957; Coleman 1990). One possible reason for the relative absence of social norms in economic research is that they are difficult to measure or quantify and it is difficult to predict the precise influence they will exert on behavior. We do so in the context of other-regarding behavior in the “dictator game,” where recent laboratory experiments demonstrate that minor contextual features of a choice environment lead to substantially different choices and outcomes.. We do so in the context of other-regarding behavior in the “dictator game,” where recent laboratory experiments demonstrate that minor contextual features of a choice environment lead to substantially different choices and outcomes.3 We show that such changes in behavior are entirely consistent with varying social norms We do so in the context of other-regarding behavior in the “dictator game,” where recent laboratory experiments demonstrate that minor contextual features of a choice environment lead to substantially different choices and outcomes. We show that such changes in behavior are entirely consistent with varying social norms
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