Abstract

The nature of the rebound effect is revealed in the article from the neo-institutional approach point of view. It is proved that the rebound effect can be considered as a phenomenon of an institutional trap. This approach formed the basis of the authors’ typology of the rebound effect, which reveals the nature of the occurrence of supported negative externalities. The article reveals the institutional mechanisms that can form inefficient stable norms (traps) that lead to the appearance or strengthening of the rebound effect, such as the coordination effect, the learning effect, the coupling effect, as well as cultural inertia and lobbying. Based on the experience of other countries (8 cases), the measures of state policy aimed at regulating the rebound effect in international practice within the framework of various types of strategies are considered. A new strategic trend has been identified – adjusting the institutional framework in the field of energy efficiency. The dependence on the complexity of the set of tools used by public institutions to reduce the rebound effect on the maturity phase of energy efficiency policy is shown. The emergence of combined strategies to mitigate the rebound effect is noted. The possibility of direct replication of successful experience in reducing the rebound effect due to the presence of an individual institutional circuit in each country is questioned.

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