Abstract

Research is inherently subjective. It is conducted within a theoretical and methodological framework, the validity of which depends on underlying assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge. The interpretation of one's own data, and the evaluation of the data interpretation of others, requires assessment of these underlying philosophical assumptions. We contend that while examination of philosophical assumptions is demonstrably an integral part of research, it is one which has largely been neglected in experimental psychology because researchers have rarely explicitly identified their ontological and epistemological assumptions. A contemporary debate in experimental psychology, that between representational and non-representational approaches to understanding the control of movement, is discussed to illustrate the influence such ontological and epistemological assumptions have upon methodological choices and upon the development and evaluation of theory.

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