Abstract
Empirical analyses of discrete games rely on behavioral as- sumptions that are crucial not just for estimation, but also for the validity of counterfactual exercises and policy implications. We find conditions for a general class of complete-information games under which it is possible to identify whether the behavior of economic agents satisfies some of these assumptions. Our results allow us to identify whether and how often firms in an entry game play Nash equilibria, and which equilibria are more likely to be selected.
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