Abstract

The benefits of using Networked Control Systems (NCS) in the growing Industry 4.0 are numerous, including better management and operational capabilities, as well as costs reduction. However, despite these benefits, the use of NCSs can also expose physical plants to new threats originated in the cyber domain—such as data injection attacks in NCS links through which sensors and controllers transmit signals. In this sense, this work proposes a link monitoring strategy to identify linear time-invariant (LTI) functions executed during controlled data injection attacks by a Man-in-the-Middle hosted in an NCS link. The countermeasure is based on a bioinspired metaheuristic, called Backtracking Search Optimization Algorithm (BSA), and uses white Gaussian noise to excite the attack function. To increase the accuracy of this countermeasure, it is proposed the Noise Impulse Integration (NII) technique, which is developed using the radar pulse integration technique as inspiration. The results demonstrate that the proposed countermeasure is able to accurately identify LTI attack functions, here executed to impair measurements transmitted by the plant sensor, without interfering with the NCS behavior when the system is in its normal operation. Moreover, the results indicate that the NII technique can increase the accuracy of the attack identification.

Highlights

  • The concept of the fourth industrial revolution—Industry 4.0 [1,2]—arises with the development and use of cyber-physical systems, which promote the computerization of manufacturing and integrate communication networks to physical processes

  • Previous works [37,38,39] report the use of Independent and Identically Distributed (IID) noise sequence as watermark to detect data injection attacks in Networked Control Systems (NCS)

  • The system consists of Proportional-Integral (PI) controller that controls the rotational speed of a DC motor – which has broad applications in industry and real-world systems, and has been widely used in previous works about NCS [8,49,50,51,52]

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Summary

Introduction

The concept of the fourth industrial revolution—Industry 4.0 [1,2]—arises with the development and use of cyber-physical systems, which promote the computerization of manufacturing and integrate communication networks to physical processes. Previous works [37,38,39] report the use of Independent and Identically Distributed (IID) noise sequence as watermark to detect data injection attacks (integrity attacks) in NCSs. the solutions proposed in [37,38,39] provide a physical authentication scheme to detect replay attacks in sensors’ measurements when the NCS is in steady state. While the watermarking schemes proposed in [37,38,39,40] aim to detect data injection attacks (replay attacks) in sensors measurements, they do not intend to identify possible LTI attack functions within the communication between sensors/actuators and controllers. It evaluates the ability of the NII technique in increasing the accuracy of the identification process.

SD-Controlled Data Injection Attack
Identification of Controlled Data Injection Attacks
Strategy to Identify the Attack
Integrating Impulses of Noise
Radar Pulse Integration
Noise Impulse Integration Technique
Results
Attacked NCSs and Parameters of the Attack
Performance of the Attack Identification
Conclusions
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