Ideas, from Hegel to Deleuze

Abstract

The Hegel-Deleuze relation has usually been considered as one of opposition, because of Deleuze's explicit anti-Hegelian statements. This article refutes the main conceptual grounds to this opposition: the critique of the negative and of the circle of return. It aims to present the possibilities offered by considering the Hegel-Deleuze relation as a problematic, productive one. "Hegel-Deleuze" would be a relation prior to the supposed terms. To achieve this, we bind them through the concept of Idea. This traditional concept of philosophy, which crowns the Hegelian system (also known as absolute idealism), appears in a key position in Deleuze's Difference and Repetition. It allows Deleuze to consider thought not as an image of the external reality or the condition of possible experience, but as the genetic principle of real experience. Even if Deleuze accuses Hegel of positing his Idea as the ground for the eternal repetition of the same, this article proposes to interpret it as the source of creation of a reality always different from itself.