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The International Criminal Court (ICC) has upheld that this Trial Chamber cannot take any decision on reparation issues correlated with the Ruto and Sang case under Article 75 of the Rome Statute because with the termination of the Ruto and Sang case the Chamber lost jurisdiction over that substance
While the Trial Chamber decision seems to be harmonious with the Court’s legal framework, the Ruto and Sang case demonstrates that the procedural requirement of the reparation provision (Article 75 of the Rome Statute) may come into tension with the victims ‘expectations to be compensated for the suffered harm
Due to the Ruto and Sang case ended without a conviction, the majority assumed that the reparations order cannot be made by this Court in accordance to Article 75 of the Rome Statute for the victims of the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya
Summary
On July 1, 2016, the ICC Trial Chamber V(A) (Trial Chamber) left without answers key questions on victims reparation central to the ICC’s firstever Decision Vacating the Charges, in which, by majority terminated the case against William Ruto and Joshua Sang. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has upheld that this Trial Chamber cannot take any decision on reparation issues correlated with the Ruto and Sang case under Article 75 of the Rome Statute because with the termination of the Ruto and Sang case the Chamber lost jurisdiction over that substance. Judge Eboe-Osuji in his opinion on the Ruto and Sang case, wondered aloud whether there may be “scope for the Court to require the Government to make adequate reparation to the victims of postelection violence.” 15 The Judge proposed that a State’s meddling in a prosecution - as Kenya has - could trigger the court’s jurisdiction to issue an order of reparations against that State He provided Article 4 (1) of the Rome Statute, as a legal basis for the Court to have “such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purpose.”. He provided Article 4 (1) of the Rome Statute, as a legal basis for the Court to have “such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purpose.” Taking these two views into consideration, the main question is whether the victims right to get reparation for the injury suffered cab be reconciled with the institutional obligation to be eligible only to order reparation when the person standing trial is found guilty? This article reflects fundamental tension within the requirements of the reparation order and the victims expectation to reparation for harm suffered
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