Abstract

A critical character epistemologist sees epistemic agents as socially situated, their dispositions and activities being significantly shaped and often constituted by their social environments. Heather also asks if social structures can themselves be vicious, in their sense of their bearing vices in their own right as well as facilitating their acquisition. In perhaps the hardest and most important question. Georgi focuses on the different sorts and degrees of salience that epistemic vices can have, a rather neglected issue within the literature on character epistemology. A key take-home from Georgi’s remarks, and Heather’s, is that thinking about the nature, harms, origins, distribution, significance, and correctability of epistemic vices must be a multidisciplinary endeavour.

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