Ian Douglas Wilson. The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-New Order Indonesia: Coercive Capital, Authority and Street Politics. Oxon, NY: Routledge, 2015, xxii+198p.

Abstract

The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-New Order Indonesia: Coercive Capital, Authority and Street PoliticsIAN DOUGLAS WILSONOxon, NY: Routledge, 2015, xxii+198p.Seventeen years have passed since fall of Suharto's New Order regime. Indonesia's reformasi has since been lauded successful case of democratization. Despite consolidation of institutional democracy, however, some critics have argued that conventional system of power relations established by end of New Order still persists, while others have argued that distribution of power and material resources is still under strong influence of small number of very wealthy individuals (Ford and Pepinsky 2014). By giving clear account of changing condition regarding politics of and mass organizations in Jakarta, this book illustrates that principle of local politics fundamentally altered after end of authoritarian regime.The originality of this study is twofold: it sees Jakarta site of local politics rather than center of national politics; it also sheds lights on positive side of mass mobilization. Studies on mass mobilization in decentralizing Indonesia have been predominantly about local politics of regions outside Jakarta, if not about politics at national level. More importantly, they have disregarded potential for mass organizations to be advocates on issues of immediate consequence to their members and neighborhoods in which they live (p. 94).In Chapter 1, Protection, Violence and State, author sets up theoretical framework for his study. Following Charles Tilly, author starts by denying state's complete monopoly over control of coercive force within its territory. However, while Tilly identifies state an entity controlling principle means of coercion within given territory (Tilly 1975, 62), Wilson sees state, with Joel Migdal, field of power marked by use and threat of violence (Migdal 2001, 15) and aim of his study identifying dynamics and contradictions of practices and strategies of parts making up this 'field of power' (ibid., 16). Thus, boundary between state and non-state actors is essentially blurred. Furthermore, Wilson cites criminologist Alfredo Schulte-Bockholt, who differs from Tilly in seeing state as product of particular historical period and stage of state-formation (p. 10) in order to conceptualize relation between regimes and of rackets protection racket regimes. These regimes are formed by state and/or non-state elites in order to preserve their through violent exclusion of large groups in society that experience condition of substantial social disparities (Schulte-Bockholt 2006, 35). But unlike Schulte-Bockholt, who presumes that power elites would simply subsume sub-hegemonic groups into dominating class across conventional class lines both systematically and ideologically (pp. 8-9), Wilson draws different picture. For mass organizations in post-New Order Jakarta are largely untethered from direct control of military or police, where the racket relationship of domination operates in peculiar brand of populist racketeering (p. 172).In Chapter 2, Reconfigured Rackets: Continuity, Change and Consolidation, author outlines how gangs and mass organizations adapted to post-New Order social environment and how they transformed themselves from racketeers into professional providers. Demographic of poor due to massive immigration and their spatial segregation from upper-middle class due to growing number of enclave residences characterize urban space of Jakarta. These conditions gave rise to insecurity and feeling of deprivation among lower middle-class population in city, including Betawi. On top of this situation was nation-wide political trend of democratization and decentralization, which gave rise to a particular kind of populist political agency of urban poor, who claim to have grass-roots relations with urban underclass and to represent such people (p. …