Abstract
Brian Garrett has criticized my diagnosis of the paradox of self‐consciousness. In reply, I focus on the classification of ‘I’‐thoughts, and show how the notion of immunity to error through misidentification can be used to characterize ‘I’‐thoughts, even though an important class of ‘I’‐thoughts (those whose expression involves what Wittgenstein called the use of ‘I’ as object) are not themselves immune to error through misidentification. ‘I’thoughts which are susceptible to error through misidentification are dependent upon those which are not. The dependence here has to do with how a thinker understands what would defeat such thoughts.
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