“I Know Not If I Delude Myself”: Rousseau’s Julie and the Ambiguities of Self-Deception

Abstract

Rousseau has long been viewed as a champion of an ethic of sincerity that celebrates the honest moral sentiments of simple souls and opposes deception and dissimulation in all its forms. I, however, argue here that Rousseau proves surprisingly receptive to the benefits of self-deception and that he views it as an important—and perhaps necessary—aspect of moral development. I advance this broad claim through an analysis of his novel Julie, which (1) distinguishes between intentional and nonintentional forms of self-deception and (2) reveals the distinctive ethical advantages and risks associated with each. By uncovering the varieties of self-deceptive experience and revealing the problematic but indispensable role that it plays in the process of moral development, this essay points to important but undertheorized tensions in the relationship of epistemic and moral virtue.