Abstract
In recent years, international attention has been turned to the ways that states use disinformation to further their own political ends. Propaganda, information conflict and active measures have long been a tool of statecraft, but the parallel development of information and communication technologies with increased levels of internal discord and social tension within states have made such disinformation campaigns both more effective and more worrying. This paper provides a brief history of Soviet “active measures”, before examining the role of Russian disinformation and cognitive warfare in Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The examination of this topic is not solely confined to a description of the methods used; it also highlights some of the ethical issues involved in Russia’s use of cognitive warfare and its heavy reliance on disinformation. Whereas information warfare focuses on controlling the flow of information, cognitive warfare instead has a more subtle yet potentially more damaging goal of shaping not simply what people think, but how they think and how they react to information. One of the significant features of the current conflict in Ukraine is the role that disinformation is playing in both driving and describing the conflict, and this paper explores the history and ethical implications of modern cognitive warfare, particularly in relation to the current conflict in Ukraine.
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