Abstract
Considered moral judgements—or ‘intuitions’—play a seemingly ineliminable role in moral inquiry, but it has proved difficult to arrive at a satisfying account of why we should take them as seriously as we do. The difficulty is particularly vexatious for robustly realist understandings of moral inquiry and its subject matter. It is more tractable for those who understand moral inquiry as the pursuit of a form of self-understanding. But the clearest and most satisfying picture of the proper role of intuitions emerges only, I argue, in the context of an expressivist, constructivist conception of moral inquiry as the pursuit of agreement on the moral norms we are willing to accept.
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