Abstract
The paper develops a defeasibility approach to Goodman's paradox according to which the unprojectibility of ‘grue’ is an extrinsic feature of the predicate, a product of epistemic context. I first introduce a general puzzle concerning disjunctive weakenings of discriminating predicates, i.e., predicates whose projections enjoy full support by positive instances but are defeated by undermining background information. The resulting challenge is to identify the precise conditions under which such disjunctive projections are defeated as well. I then argue that the grue-paradox is an instance of this general puzzle and that ‘grue’ fails to be projectible because it is evidentially dependent on a discriminating predicate.
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