I. Austrian Methodology

Abstract

The search for a foundation of true and valid theory implies the use of logical deduction. This method, however, only ensures the transfer of the 'truth-value' (Wahrheitswert) already present in the premises, but not the 'truth-value' of the premises themselves. The point is how to ensure the truth of the initial premises. This paper analyses the methodology of Menger and Mises who both try to solve the problem in a particular way. Menger establishes a methodological dualism in theory by combining inductive and deductive reasoning. However he provides no clear-cut criterion for securing the validity of the theory as a whole. Thus, his dualistic theory is not fully satisfactory. It is Mises's conception of praxeology which tries to escape this problem. In order to establish his system of praxeology Mises starts with the fundamental axiom of human action as a real a priori category. The ultimate truth of this basic axiom is ensured by reflexive introspection. All synthetical propositions have to be derived from this axiom. With the term 'quasi-formal' science the intention is to grasp two properties of human action: as the notion 'quasi-formal' suggests, praxeology allows a strict derivation of propositions, i.e. theorems, as in the formal sciences but contrary to that the validity of the propositions extends not only to the formal procedure but also to fundamental aspects of reality. This information is introspectively true and real because the category of human action is part of man's mental structure, as it was formed in the course of evolution. Thus, the implications of praxeology are independent of personal experience—i.e. ontogenetically a priori. Nevertheless they are coined by reality over aeons in a historical process. In other words, they are phylogenetically a posteriori.