Hydraulic fracturing, coalition activity and shock: Assessing the potential for coalition-based collective action in Argentina’s Vaca Muerta formation

Abstract

Examining the early stages of coalition formation and how they may react to rapid institutional changes provides insight into how like-minded policy actors pursue their goals and coordinate their behavior in relatively unstable institutional systems. This study observes activity in the policy subsystem of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) in the southern Argentinian province of Neuquén. Using media sources, we identify policy actors, their support or opposition to the expansion of unconventional oil and gas production through fracking and their agreement or disagreement on the topic of fracking, both before and after Chevron and YPF (the large publicly-owned Argentinian energy company) signed a controversial accord to develop parts of the Vaca Muerta formation, one of the largest in the world. Using Social Network Analysis, we show that two coalitions (pro and anti fracking) exist, and that they exhibit a high potential for intra-coalitional coordination and inter-coalitional conflict. Following the signing of the accord, which we see as an example of an “institutional shock”, significant increases in activity and the potential for intra-coordination within the anti-fracking coalition were observed, along with an increase in the potential for conflict between the coalitions. Our results illuminate shed new light on how coalitions may form and evolve in unstable institutional systems where political power is unevenly distributed.