Abstract

The transgressive ontological character of hybrids—entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects—calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of “moral considerability” and related to it the idea of “intrinsic value” understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of moral considerability by reexamining the legitimacy of identifying intrinsic value with a non-instrumental one. We offer the concept of “functional value,” which we define as a simultaneous contribution to the common good of the ecosystem and the possibility to disclose the full variety of aspects of a being’s identity. We argue that such a value of hybrids allows us to include them into the scope of moral considerability.

Highlights

  • In our environment today, one can find ever increasing numbers of hybrids—entities that straddle the boundary between naturalness and artificiality

  • There is a common agreement among environmental ethicists that moral considerability should be restricted to the set of natural beings, but the very existence of hybrids, which can transcend the categories of nature and technology, may spur us to revisit the scope of moral considerability

  • Environmental ethics was the first field to discuss the issue of the moral considerability of non-human beings

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Summary

Introduction

One can find ever increasing numbers of hybrids—entities that straddle the boundary between naturalness and artificiality. We argue for the ethical upgrade of hybrids and their inclusion among other morally considerable entities. This will require a reevaluation of the idea of intrinsic value as a non-instrumental one—as well as other concepts related to it—since the instrumental character of artifacts is the rationale for excluding hybrids from the scope of moral considerability. We offer possible strategies of shifting the boundaries of moral considerability in order to include hybrids and sketch implications for policy practices

Dualism of Natural and Artificial Beings
The Hybrids
Criteria of Moral Considerability
Ethical Exclusion of Artifacts
Functional Value
Conclusions
Full Text
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