Hybrid Warfare and the Changing Character of Conflict

Abstract

From little green men in Crimea to little blue men in South China Sea, idea that international conflict might be seeing more warfare and threats has animated debate among security and defense establishments in and beyond.1 In fact, term warfare has become bit of staple of Europe's security policy vocabulary. and EU are working on strategy papers aimed at strengthening defensive capabilities and preventing attacks. National governments drafting security and defense review documents make frequent reference to need to address threats. Journalists have adopted term hybrid as shorthand for tac- tics in Ukraine, apparently with assumption that readers already know what this means.NATO's Wales Summit Declaration from 5 September 2014 says Alliance leaders ensure that is able to effectively address specific challenges posed by warfare threats, where wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in highly integrated design. It is essential that Alliance possesses necessary tools and procedures required to deter and respond effectively to warfare threats, and capabilities to reinforce national forces.* 2While Wales declaration put issue of war in specific context of Russia/Ukraine crisis and triggered efforts to prepare to effectively meet such threats, scope of challenge is much wider and core dynamics are often located outside military realm. Earlier work conducted at Allied Command Transformation under label Countering Hybrid Threats acknowledges as much, but it seems as if insights generated at time were not systematically pursued until Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea served as stark reminder.3Why Should We Care?With view to conflict in Ukraine, analysts come to different assessments. Anton Dengg and Michael Schurian argue Ukraine conflict suggests employing means to project power might be an important trend that could shape character of threats to come.4 The British National Security Strategy and its supporting Strategic Defence and Security Review, published at end of November 2015, state that the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and continuing support for separatists in eastern Ukraine through use of deniable, tactics and media manipulation have shown Russia's willingness to undermine wider international standards of cooperation in order to secure its perceived interest.5 These strategic documents treat threats both as tier one challenges, which might affect UK directly, and as tier two threats, which would start as attack on an ally. Diego Ruiz Palmer summarizes Russia's aims as achieving politically decisive outcomes with, if possible, no or only limited and overt use of military force, while being prepared to act militarily, with devastating effect at operational level... aim at attaining decisive political advantage short of war.6 The main takeaway is that much of activity related to conflict will take place beneath threshold that most Western observers would consider armed conflict, much less war.Samuel Charap at International Institute for Strategic Studies suggests that Russia's approach would not travel well beyond specific circumstances of conflict in Ukraine. Charap maintains Russia does not have a hybrid-war doctrine that could be effectively deployed against NATO and goes on to warn talking up issue of warfare poses danger in itself: Russian strategists believe that US is willing to risk conducting limited, operation in Russia ... just as strategists believe Russia is willing to risk same on territory of [NATO].7 Can Kasapoglu, in rather nuanced analysis, points out that might not be facing military strategy, but Alliance should realize that new military thinking that brings about shifts at strategic, operational, and tactical levels along with doctrinal order of battle and military strategic culture has emerged in Russia around concept of nonlinear warfare. …