Hybrid plaintext attack for a cryptosystem based on interference and the phase-retrieval technique.

Abstract

In this paper, the security strength of an enhanced cryptosystem based on interference and the phase-retrieval technique is evaluated. The security strength of the optical cryptosystem was improved through the phase-retrieval technique used to generate a phase-only mask (POM) as the ciphertext. Due to the complex mathematical model of the phase-retrieval technique, it seems that a silhouette problem existing in the conventional interference-based scheme was removed. However, we noted that the random phase mask (RPM) regarded as the only private key was fixed in the encryption path, which is not related to the plaintext and makes it possible to be recovered using a known-plaintext attack (KPA). Moreover, we also found that the RPM has high key sensitivity, and it should be recovered precisely to retrieve information of plaintexts during the attack. Thus, a hybrid KPA where three pairs of known plaintexts and their ciphertexts are regarded as the amplitude and phase constraints to obtain the precise estimation of the RPM is proposed. Then, with the help of the estimated private key, information of the original plaintexts encoded using the cryptosystem under study could be retrieved from an arbitrarily given ciphertext without any knowledge of the private key. Our cryptoanalysis shows that the cryptosystem based on interference and the phase-retrieval technique is vulnerable to the proposed attack, and there is a security leak in it. Numerical simulations have been carried out to demonstrate the performance of our proposed attack.