Hybrid Governance and the Attribution of Political Responsibility: Experimental Evidence from the United States

Eleanor Florence Woodhouse,Paolo Belardinelli,Anthony Michael Bertelli

doi:10.1093/jopart/muab014

Abstract

AbstractHow does the mode of public service delivery affect the attribution of responsibility for public goods? Through a survey experiment on a sample of more than 1,000 Americans, we provide evidence of how the allocation of public goods shapes voters’ support for incumbent politicians. We find that voters prefer a mixture of public–private financing and management when it comes to the delivery of infrastructure. However, once performance information is available, the mode of infrastructure delivery no longer influences their voting intention. The successful delivery of these infrastructure projects is what ultimately matters to voters. Moreover, this preference for a mixture of public and private involvement in public service delivery is stronger among citizens with high political knowledge, who are more likely to punish the incumbent for a failed first phase of the public service delivery. These findings deepen our understanding of how hybrid forms of public service delivery are perceived by voters and how performance information affects evaluations of the performance of public services and politicians alike.

Highlights

Mechanisms for delivering public goods and services that blur the lines between public and private have become increasingly common in both developed and developing countries (Jang, McSparren, and Yuliya Rashchupkina 2016; World Bank 2016)
How does the mode of public service delivery affect the attribution of responsibility for public goods? Through a survey experiment on a sample of more than 1,000 Americans, we provide evidence of how the allocation of public goods shapes voters’ support for incumbent politicians
Once performance information is released, participants are less concerned about the mode of public service delivery and pay more attention to performance in public service delivery, with incumbent vote intention not changing depending on the mode of public service delivery

Summary

Introduction

Mechanisms for delivering public goods and services that blur the lines between public and private have become increasingly common in both developed and developing countries (Jang, McSparren, and Yuliya Rashchupkina 2016; World Bank 2016). Contractual agreements between the government and private partners form the basis for building or improving infrastructure, such as highways, airports, railroads, bridges, roads, water or wastewater facilities, school buildings, prisons, or sports facilities (Bertelli 2019; Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2015; Hodge and Greve 2007). These arrangements make the public and private sectors less distinguishable because private actors—rather than governments—bear a significant part of the risk involved in the construction and management of infrastructure as a means to incentivize the efficient use of resources (Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic 2013). Given the scale of these infrastructure projects and the projected importance of PPPs for delivering them, it is essential to understand the politics of PPPs—how such arrangements are used politically and how voters respond to them

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