Abstract
n the analysis of value capture, it is central to understand what value each group of players can capture when leaving the negotiation table. Frequently, this will entail engaging in competition, i.e., non-negotiated, strategic interactions with the other players. For instance, if merger talks fail, parties may instead compete on the market. I propose to analyze such situations using a combination of cooperative and noncooperative games, which I refer to as hybrid games. Applications demonstrate how the nature and intensity of the non-negotiated interactions determine value capture, and that a correct delineation of negotiation groups is essential for a realistic analysis. I also show that biform hybrid games feature a type of value-based business strategy in which the stage-one actions literally change the game.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
