Husserl’s Notion of Solitary Speech Reconsidered: In Conversation with Vygotsky

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper clarifies the phenomenon Edmund Husserl referred to as “solitary speech,” defending his account against the deconstructionist claim that it serves as a mere prop for his transcendental project. To do this, first, I examine how this idea has been misunderstood by Jacques Derrida in Speech and Phenomena. Second, I present Husserl's account of solitary speech as a strictly phenomenological-psychological analysis of a concrete unit of psychic experience, drawing on Husserl's broader view on the relationship between psychology and phenomenology. Third, I compare Husserl's account to Lev Vygotsky's empirical psychological account of “inner speech” to demonstrate their affinity, and to re-establish the misunderstood theme of solitary speech as a concrete linguistic and cognitive phenomenon. This not only corrects the deconstructionist bias but sets a proper approach to the phenomenon of solitary speech, which can contribute to a broader account of the linguistic and cultural formation of human consciousness.