Abstract
The aim of this article is to investigate the reception of Husserl’s theory of meaning by Ajdukiewicz and Blaustein, two members of the analytically-oriented Lvov-Warsaw School, who, in different ways, were attracted to and confronted with Husserl’s phenomenology. The discussed hypothesis is that Ajdukiewicz’s interpretation of Logical Investigations, and his original theory of meaning influenced both Blaustein’s critical reading of Husserl’s theory of intentionality and his account of meaning-intention. After outlining the central elements of “First Logical Investigation” the paper shows how it is interpreted by Ajdukiewicz in his Lvov lectures on logic and in his directival theory of meaning. What emerges is a psychological-descriptive interpretation of Husserl’s concept of meaning, and a reconsideration of his theory of intentionality within the inferential structure of beliefs in premises that motivates a person who speaks a language to believe in conclusions of a certain form. This leads Ajdukiewicz to his own original conventionalist account of meaning which is based on the identification of three main directives of meaning that represent the matrix of a given language, i.e., the grid in which each meaning finds its place. These elements allow one to demonstrate how Ajdukiewicz’s interpretation resonates in Blaustein’s critique of Husserl in his early writings, where, in addition to a psychological-descriptive reading of phenomenology we also find a conventionalist conception of meaning acts and signitive presentations. According to Blaustein, a sign can represent an object only through the conventions arising from the directives of meaning that belong to a given natural language.
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