Hume’s Dynamic Coordination and International Law

Carmen E Pavel

doi:10.1177/0090591720921831

Abstract

At the heart of the tension between state autonomy and international law is the question of whether states should willingly restrict their freedom of action for the sake of international security, human rights, trade, communication, and the environment. David Hume offers surprising insights to answer this question. He argues that the same interests in cooperation arise among individuals as well as states and that their interactions should be regulated by the same principles. Drawing on his model of dynamic coordination, I will reconstruct the Humean case for developing international law into a more robust legal system and also highlight the limitation of Hume’s account of justice for such a reconstructive project. Hume’s lessons are enduring; we must strengthen the essential features of international law that allow states and individuals to reap the benefits of its protections, such as nonoptional rules that articulate a moral minimum, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and stronger mechanisms of enforcement.

Highlights

Do individuals and states have reason to create and submit to the rules of international law? The tension between sovereign independence and international law is at the heart of recent initiatives by states to withdraw from the Paris Agreement or the International Criminal Court.[1]
One might think that states cannot have it both ways; they cannot reap the benefits of a system of international law that limits negative externalities from other states, restricts the use of violence, and guarantees a sphere of autonomous state action and at the same time claim that international law is optional and their autonomy absolute
David Hume (1711–1776) offers a surprising resource for this argument, because he claims that the same reasons for adopting and developing a legal system at the domestic level hold at the international level, even if the content and character of those rules will be different

Summary

Introduction

Do individuals and states have reason to create and submit to the rules of international law? The tension between sovereign independence and international law is at the heart of recent initiatives by states to withdraw from the Paris Agreement or the International Criminal Court.[1]. The final section shows why we need to supplement the Humean framework with a focus on the intrinsic and equal moral worth of individual human beings in order to both give a fuller account of the norms of justice instantiated in international law and to explain the significant development of international human rights law. Despite his lacunae in this area, Hume remains helpful in illuminating why this particular area of international law continues to be weak

Objectives

Conclusion