Hume's criticisms of induction and Peirce's semiotic epistemology: the value of pluralistic approaches for organizational knowledge

Abstract

This article proposes a comparative analysis between two fundamental philosophical theories that contribute to the construction of knowledge: David Hume's Critique of Induction and Charles Sanders Peirce's Cooperation of Truth. We will examine how these two approaches address the process of knowledge acquisition and reasoning. While Hume questions the validity of induction, Peirce develops a semiotic epistemology based on sign mediation. The analysis demonstrates that both highlight the role of inference in knowledge acquisition, though there are differences regarding the reliability of inductive reasoning. Furthermore, while Hume emphasizes the problem of justification, Peirce focuses on the cooperative pursuit of truth. By exploring these theories, we aim to discuss how they contribute to our understanding of the process through which we acquire and justify knowledge, also within an organizational context.