Hume's Argument for the Temporal Priority of Causes

Abstract

In a section entitled Of Probability; and of the idea of cause and effect, Hume embarks on a search for the conceptual components of our idea of causation. Rejecting the possibility of analyzing the idea terms of the qualities of objects, Hume claims to discover two constituent relations. First, a cause and effect must be contiguous space and time because nothing can operate a time or place, which is ever so little remov'd from those of its existence (T 1.3.2.6; SBN 75).x Second, a cause must be temporally prior to its effect. Although experience is said to confirm this latter requirement in most instances, Hume goes on to present an argument purporting to demonstrate that the temporal priority of a cause is an essential feature of every instance of causation.2 Despite the extensive treatment that his analysis of causation has occasioned, Hume's argument for the temporal priority of causes has received comparatively little attention. In this paper I hope to remedy this neglect by providing a more accurate explication of the argument than has previously been offered. Hume does not argue directly for the claim that a cause must be temporally prior to its effect. Rather he offers an alleged reductio ad absurdum of the opposing view that 'tis not absolutely necessary a cause shou'd precede its effect; but that any object or action, the very first moment of its existence, may exert its productive quality, and give rise to another object or action, perfectly co-temporary with itself (T 1.3.2.7; SBN 76). This careful summary