Abstract
Hume regards the �absolute� necessity attending demonstrable propositions as an expression of the limitations of human imagination. When we register our modal commitments in ordinary descriptive language, affirming that there are such-and-such absolute necessities, possibilities, and impossibilities, we are projecting our sense of what the human mind can and cannot conceive. In some ways the account parallels Hume�s famous treatment of the necessity of causes, and in some respects it anticipates recent expressivist theories of absolute modality. I marshal the evidence for this interpretation, show how it can explain a number of otherwise puzzling features of Hume�s modal epistemology and metaphysics, and situate this account of our modal discourse in Hume�s wider programme for a science of human nature.
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