Hume, History, and Human Nature

Abstract

I. David Hume has been frequently accused by his critics of having grossly misunderstood the nature of historical judgment, and consequently, of failing to grasp the elements constituting the historical enterprise. General consensus has it that his idea of history is inadequate for a reason not unique to Hume but shared by all eighteenthcentury historians and perhaps the most predominant (if not the most remembered) characteristic of eighteenth-century historiography. The major flaw in Hume's understanding, as the critics see it, is in his conception of human nature. The statement from Hume most frequently quoted in this regard comes from the first Inquiry: Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature.' In the course of this paper, I shall examine the interpretation and argument which critics have based on these two sentences, and then reexamine Hume's writings in the light of the accusations. I shall show that the critics' view is simply mistaken or unfounded, and that Hume's idea of history is far more sophisticated and individual than the critics' view of it.