Hume, David

Abstract

In ethics, David Hume is best known for four claims: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “slave of the passions.” (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason. (3) Moral distinctions are derived from the moral sentiments. (4) While some virtues and vices are natural, others, including justice, are artificial. Hume supports the first claim, that reason is “inert,” with his account of motivation to action and three famous arguments, leading to the conclusion that reason alone cannot set or evaluate ends. The second claim, Hume's rejection of moral rationalism, is explained here, and its supporting arguments are laid out. Some conclude from these arguments that Hume is a non‐cognitivist about moral judgments, but there are strong reasons to deny this. After canvasing the main conflicting interpretations of Hume's famous “is–ought” passage, we consider different scholars’ accounts of what, for him, moral judgments consist of. We explain the origins of the moral sentiments, their roots in sympathy, and their adjustment from the common point of view. We explain the distinction Hume draws between the natural and the artificial virtues, recount his story of the origin of justice with regard to property, and examine a few of the virtues he classifies as natural. Finally, the differences between Hume's ethical views in theTreatise of Human Natureand theEnquiry concerning the Principles of Moralsare enumerated.