Abstract

In previous papers, we introduced a normative scheme for scene construction and epistemic (visual) searches based upon active inference. This scheme provides a principled account of how people decide where to look, when categorising a visual scene based on its contents. In this paper, we use active inference to explain the visual searches of normal human subjects; enabling us to answer some key questions about visual foraging and salience attribution. First, we asked whether there is any evidence for ‘epistemic foraging’; i.e. exploration that resolves uncertainty about a scene. In brief, we used Bayesian model comparison to compare Markov decision process (MDP) models of scan-paths that did–and did not–contain the epistemic, uncertainty-resolving imperatives for action selection. In the course of this model comparison, we discovered that it was necessary to include non-epistemic (heuristic) policies to explain observed behaviour (e.g., a reading-like strategy that involved scanning from left to right). Despite this use of heuristic policies, model comparison showed that there is substantial evidence for epistemic foraging in the visual exploration of even simple scenes. Second, we compared MDP models that did–and did not–allow for changes in prior expectations over successive blocks of the visual search paradigm. We found that implicit prior beliefs about the speed and accuracy of visual searches changed systematically with experience. Finally, we characterised intersubject variability in terms of subject-specific prior beliefs. Specifically, we used canonical correlation analysis to see if there were any mixtures of prior expectations that could predict between-subject differences in performance; thereby establishing a quantitative link between different behavioural phenotypes and Bayesian belief updating. We demonstrated that better scene categorisation performance is consistently associated with lower reliance on heuristics; i.e., a greater use of a generative model of the scene to direct its exploration.

Highlights

  • This paper is about salience attribution in visual searches

  • That did and did not contain epistemic, uncertainty-resolving imperatives for policy selection to saccadic behaviour, we have shown that healthy subjects’ visual exploration–of even simple scenes–provides substantial evidence for the use of epistemic affordance or salience in visual exploration

  • A bias towards using heuristic policies to explore visual scenes was associated with lower accuracy in all three canonical variates relating model parameters to behaviour: see the canonical variates in the lower panels of Fig 8

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Summary

Introduction

How do we identify salient targets during saccadic (visual) searches of our visual scenes–and what sorts of policies and prior beliefs underwrite this attribution and subsequent epistemic foraging. Itti and Baldi [2] demonstrated that whilst human visual attention is attracted to areas of high Shannon information, it is attracted most strongly to areas that cause the greatest shifts in our beliefs about the world. This notion is formalised as ‘Bayesian surprise’ [2]: the KL divergence between prior and posterior beliefs about how our sensory data are generated. In the active inference framework, stimuli that are expected to produce greater Bayesian surprise have more epistemic value and are more likely to be sampled through active vision

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