Human rights pragmatism: Belief, inquiry, and action

Abstract

Human rights scholars and activists have often been criticized for being “principled” rather than “pragmatic” actors in international politics. Rarely, though, is such criticism accompanied by a discussion of what pragmatism means, or what pragmatic action looks like. This article conceptually traces and defines three aspects of pragmatism — philosophical, methodological, and political — that might be applied to the global human rights discourse. The article then outlines how these aspects can help resolve debates over human rights beliefs, scientific inquiry, and political action. I argue, first, that critics of human rights do not adequately develop the concept of human rights pragmatism, and then I make the case using examples that human rights discourse already lends itself toward a pragmatic train of thought. The implication of this analysis is that the “pragmatist” critique of human rights actors is, at minimum, unfounded and, at maximum, a mask for more pessimistic anti-rights positions.