Human Rights and the Liberal Democratic State -- Revisiting Rights Through a Lockean Lens

Abstract

John Locke’s account of political legitimacy begins from universalist and individualist premises but ends by tying individual rights recognition under the law of the state to political membership. I argue that Locke’s theory has partisan implications in relation to rights recognition and the standing of political communities that are not justified by his founding premises. I conclude by suggesting there are significant parallels between Locke’s account of political legitimacy and how individual rights are conceptualized within contemporary liberal democracies, as well as in the international human rights system. As in Locke, there is a tension in liberal democracies and in the international system between universal individualism and political sovereignty. This tension is widely recognized, but its roots in classical liberalism have not been fully acknowledged or explored. As a result, we are yet to engage adequately with its implications for how we think about human rights and about individuals as the bearers of rights.