Human Rights and Individual Responsibility: Identifying the Individual ‘Margin of Appreciation’

Abstract

A greater stress on individual responsibility is essential for a more effective protection of human dignity and, ultimately, for securing the future of the idea of human rights. However, this responsibility is an ethical concept and must be distinguished from its moral and legal counterparts. With responsibility comes authority, meaning that individuals have an area of discretion, which must be respected by others and the State, but with regard to which there exists also certain expectations towards the bearer. This idea of an ‘ethical space’ is already familiar to (European) human rights law, where the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ and the related concept of the ‘margin of appreciation’ define the relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and the States party to the European Convention on Human Rights. This relationship resembles, mutatis mutandis, the relationship between the State and the individual. The resulting inter-personal ethical diversity, which inevitably entails a certain level of ethical conflict, is thus both a logical consequence of individual responsibility, as well as an essential feature of a democratic society, which is based on the principle of human dignity.